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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
state corporation receives the same benefits and protection as intra-
state vendors.20
If such an analysis is correct, the decision should have little prac-
tical effect upon the present administration and collection of use taxes,21
because the way will have been left open to impose tax collecting obli-
gations on foreign corporations which make deliveries into a taxing
state after encroaching upon its markets by inducing (e.g., by direct
advertising, mail and telephone solicitation, etc.) its customers to cross
the state line for tax-saving purposes. On the other hand, if this
decision means that such corporations may now escape liability, its
effect will no doubt be to increase the number of merchants seeking
to capitalize on the sales tax of neighboring states at the expense of
the local market, thereby further increasing the difficulties of adminis-
tration and collection of the use tax.
WILLIAm E. GRAHAM, JR.
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection Clause-Exclusion of a Class
from Jury Service
Twenty years ago the United States Supreme Court decided that
discrimination of a nature prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution' occurs
when it is shown by a Negro defendant that for a generation or longer
no person of African descent has been called for jury service although
qualified Negroes are available within the county wherein the trial
is held.2 The rule is sometimes referred to as the "Norris" rule.
Recently in Hernandez v. Texas,, the Court was faced with the
" In People v. West Pub. Co., 35 Cal. 2d 80, 91, 216 P. 2d 441, 448 (1950),
the California Supreme Court held the defendant publishing company liable for
the collection of the use tax where it maintained offices and soliciting agents
within the state. In so holding, the court used the following language: "The
state provided a market in which appellant operated in competition with local
law book publishers, and its salesmen received the same protection and other
benefits from the state as salesmen carrying on business activities for a com-
pany engaged in intrastate business."
21 Of course, the decision might have some effect because the collection of
the use tax through the vendor is the most effective method of enforcing the
tax and the decision exempts one *class of foreign vendors from that responsi-
bility. However, at present few state statutes are as broad as the Maryland
statute in defining companies "engaged in business within the state," but they
are, for the most part, directed at foreign corporations maintaining places of
business within the state or engaging in some form of local solicitation or ad-
vertising.
'U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1. "No State shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
2 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935). No Negro had served on the
jury within the memory of witnesses who had lived in the county for life. The
pronounced rule is one of presumption, and may be overcome by a sufficient
showing of facts by the state.
374 Sup. Ct. 667 (1954).
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question of whether the rule should be extended to cover nationalities
as well as races.
In this case the defendant, an American citizen of Mexican descent,
was indicted for murder, tried and convicted. In his appeal to the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals he stated that no person of Mexican
extraction had served on a county grand jury or petit jury for the
past twenty-five years, although qualified persons of Mexican descent
resided within the county. Though unable to prove actual discrimina-
ti6n, the defendant insisted that the "Norris" test should be applied
to prove his allegations. Countering, the state maintained that the
rule applied only to members of different races, and that since persons
of Mexican descent are primarily members of the white race no pre-
sumption of discrimination should be found. The defendant's convic-
tion was affirmed,4 and the United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari.5
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for a unanimous Court, re-
versed the conviction, holding: (1) that the state court erred in limiting
the application of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the white and Negro races; (2) that the "Norris" rule
applied; and (3) that the state had failed to rebut the prima facie
showing of discrimination.
By way of background, the Supreme Court has long held that a
state may not pass a law prohibiting Negroes from serving on juries. 6
"Whenever by any action of a state, whether through its legislature,
through its courts or through its executive or administrative officers,
all persons of the African race are excluded, solely because of their
race or color, from serving as . . . jurors in the criminal prosecution
of a person of the African race, the equal protection of the laws is
denied to him. ... ."
The list of persons from which the jury is to be drawn must contain
a cross-section of the defendant's community.8 However, there is no
'Hernandez v. Texas, 251 S. W. 2d 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1952).
Hernandez v. Texas, 346 U. S. 811 (1953).
0 Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U. S. 110 (1882). Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370
(1880), involved a statute whereby qualified voters could serve as jurors, and
by the Delaware Constitution only whites could vote. Strouder v. West Vir-
ginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1879).
"Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442,447 (1900). Here the trial court refused
to hear witnesses offered by the defendant to prove his allegation of discrimina-
tion. In Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 226, 231 (1904), the court refused to
pass on the question of the defendant's rights under the Alabama Constitution
on a motion to quash the indictment. Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565
(1896), involved the Mississippi constitutional provision that no person could
be a juror unless a qualified voter, able to read and write. See also Neal v.
Delaware, supra note 6.
' Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217, 220 (1946). "The American
tradition of trial by jury . . . necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn
from a cross-section of the community."
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guaranty to him of a jury composed entirely of members of his own
race,9 nor even a mixed jury.10  But jury commissioners may not
limit those from whom juries are selected to persons of their own
personal acquaintance, for "if there has been discrimination, whether
accomplished ingeniously or ingenuously, the conviction cannot stand."'"
It is a commissioner's duty to familiarize himself "with the qualifica-
tions of the eligible jurors of the county without regard to race or
color."'
2
Where the evidence introduced by the defendant shows only that
no Negro served on the grand jury that indicted and the petit jury
that tried him, a motion to quash the indictment based on alleged dis-
crimination is properly denied. 13  But a prima fade case is made out
upon a showing of long continued, systematic exclusion of Negroes. 14
Uncontroverted affidavits are sufficient to show a systematic and arbi-
trary exclusion because of race or color.' " And, where white and
yellow tickets were used by jury commissioners, for the white and
Negro races respectively, and no Negro appeared on the jury panel,
though qualified members of that race resided in the county, a prima
facie case of discrimination was established.' 6
Discrimination against members of a defendant's political party has
been held unconstitutional.' 7 So too, where there was deliberate and
' Preleau v. United States, 271 Fed. 361 (D. C. Cir. 1921).
10 Aldns v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398 (1945); Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316
(1906) (the defendant demanded a mixed jury as a matter of right).; Virginia
v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313 (1879) (the defendant moved that the venire, which
was composed entirely of whites, be modified so as to allow one third thereof
to be composed of Negroes.).
" Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 132 (1940). Jury commissioners testified
that the reason they failed to select Negroes was that they did not know the
names of any who were qualified.
1" Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 283, 289 (1950).
1 "Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 592 (1896). See Thomas v. Texas, 212
U. S. 278 (1909) ; Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316 (1906).
"' Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282
(1950) (out of twenty-one grand juries, only a few contained one Negro, while
seven per cent of the eligible voters were Negroes); Patton v. Mississippi, 332
U. S. 463 (1947) (one third of the population was Negro, but none had served on
the grand jury for thirty years) ; Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400 (1942) (8,000 of
the 66,000 poll tax payers in the county were Negroes); Smith v. Texas, 311
U. S. 128 (1940) (for seven years, during which time thirty-two grand juries
had been called, only five Negroes served, while twenty per cent of the popula-
tion was Negro). See Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 345 (1939).1 Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U. S. 613, 616 (1938).
" Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559 (1953). The Court made no mention of
the rule that there has to be shown a systematic exclusion.17Kentucky v. Powers, 139 Fed. 452 (C. C. E. D. Ky. 1905), re7/d on other
grouds, 201 U. S. 1 (1906). The defendant, a Republican, was charged with the
crime of being an accessory before the fact to murder. He had been convicted by
the trial court three times, and on each occasion the appellate court sent the case
back for a new trial due to error. He petitioned for removal to the federal
court, on the ground that he had a right to be tried by jurors without dis-
crimination against those who belonged to the same political class to which he
belonged, to wit, Republican, and that members of that class had been excluded,
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systematic exclusion of members of a particular religious fTith,' 8 and
where wage earners were arbitrarily excluded from service on a jury
panel,19 discrimination was found. The systematic and intentional
exclusion of women from grand or petit jury panels in a federal dis-
trict court was held to warrant a dismissal of an indictment against
a woman charged with a federal offense.20 The Constitution, how-
ever, does not prohibit a state from excluding from jury service certain
occupational groups,21 and the use of a special or "Blue Ribbon" jury
in counties of one million or more people in certain classes of cases
does not on its face deny equal protection of the laws.
22
As to procedural aspects, one who wishes to avail himself of the
defense that there was discrimination in the selection of the jurors who
indicted or tried him should raise the constitutional question in the
state court during the trial, and if overruled should appeal to the
highest state court. If he fails to do so, he cannot have the adverse
decision reviewed by a federal court.P Generally a challenge to the
array before trial is used to quash the indictment,24 or a motion is
denying him his right to the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The petition was denied and the case came before
the federal court on a motion for habeas corpus to remove him from the custody
of the state and put him in the custody of the United States. In granting the
motion the federal court stated that the defendant was entitled to such removal
upon a showing of such discrimination.
"SJuarez v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. App. 297, 277 S. W. 1091 (1925). (Crim-
inal prosecution for selling liquor, in a state court, and the defendant petitioned
to have the indictment set aside because Roman Catholics had been excluded
from jury service, and that he was a member of that denomination, and that
such exclusion denied him his equal rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Held: it was the duty of the court to hear the evidence and if such discrimina-
tion were found the indictment should have been set aside.)
1 Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217 (1946). This was a civil
action brought in a federal court under the Federal Employers Liability Act.
The exclusion of daily wage earners from the jury panel was held to be re-
versible error, not on constitutional grounds, but on the ground of improper
administration of the jury system in the federal courts.
"0 Ballard v. United States, 329 U. S. 187, 195 (1946). The woman had
violated a federal criminal statute and the Court said that in a state where
women are permitted to serve as jurors under local law, a federal jury panel
from which women are intentionally and systematically excluded is not properly
constituted and the Court will exercise its power of supervision over the ad-
ministration of justice in the federal courts to correct the error. The Court
was upholding the tradition that trial by jury contemplates an impartial jury
from a cross-section of the community.
2 Rowlings v. Georgia, 201 U. S. 638 (1906). If the exclusion of the class
is for the good of the community, then the law is proper. (Statute excluded
from jury service lawyers, ministers, preachers, doctors, dentists, railroad fire-
men and engineers).
" Fay v. New York, 332 U. S. 261, 271 (1947). "In a metropolis with
notoriously congested court calendars we cannot find it constitutionally forbidden
to set up procedures in advance of trial to eliminate from the jury panel those
who, in a large proportion of cases, would be rejected by the court after its
time had been taken in examination to ascertain their disqualifications.""It re Wood, 140 U. S. 278 (1891).
2 Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 406 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128,
130 (1940); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565, 584 (1896).
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made to quash the trial jury panel. There is a possible alternative
procedure: a defendant who is denied or cannot enforce in a state
court any law providing for the equal civil rights of United States
citizens may have the case removed to a federal district court.25
Apparently no state court has held, as did the Supreme Court in
the principal case, that systematic exclusion of a nationality from jury
service violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as to a defendant descended from that nationality, but there are
dicta to that effect. 26 Language used by the Texas court itself in
several cases denotes a belief that exclusion of citizens of a particular
nationality from jury service is a denial of equal protection of the laws
where there is proof of actual discrimination.2 In fact, when the
instant case was before the state court, it was stated that "it cannot
be said, in the absence of proof of actual discrimination, that appellant
has been discriminated against in the organization of such juries...."
28
(Emphasis supplied). In Juarez v. TeXas,2 the systematic exclusion
of Catholics from jury service was held to be violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment. So it appears that the Texas court has had no trouble
applying the "Norris" rule to classes other than white or Negro, ex-
cept where the question presented involved the exclusion of persons
of Mexican descent, and even there it intimated that the rule should
be applied to the latter group if actual discrimination were shown
against the defendant. No valid reason was given for the distinction.
The decision in the principal case extends the "Norris" rule for
the first time. That the Court ruled correctly is manifest from the
trend established in the prior decisions. It is equally manifest that
the Court will continue to expand the application of the rule if the
occasions arise. The Fourteenth Amendment, though enacted and
ratified because of fear of discrimination against a particular race, is
2 16 STAT. 144 (1870), 28 U. S. C. 1443 (1952). "Any of the following
actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in a state court may be removed
by the defendant to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing wherein it is pending:
"(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of
such State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens
of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof; .... "
Apparently Strouder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1879) restricts this to
cases where the discrimination is by the constitution or laws of a state.
2 State v. Brown, 233 N. C. 202, 205, 63 S. E. 2d 99, 101 (1950). "It has
been the consistent holding of this jurisdiction . . . that the intentional, arbitrary
and systematic exclusion of any portion of the population from jury service,
grand or petit, on account of race, color, creed, or national origin, is at variance
with the fundamental law and cannot stand." See Richards v. State, 144 Fla.
177, 181, 197 So. 772, 774 (1940).
"Sanchez v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. Rep. 463, 181 S. W. 2d 87 (1944);
Carrasco v. State, 130 Tex. Crim. Rep. 659, 95 S. W. 2d 433 (1936) ; Ramirez
v. State, 119 Tex. Crim. Rep. 362, 40 S. W. 2d 138 (1931)."8Hernandez v. State, 251 S. W. 2d 531, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1952).
0 102 Tex. Crim. App. 297, 277 S. W. 1091 (1925).
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not restric.ted in its application to members of that race. Its protection
is also available "when the existence of a distinct class is demonstrated,
and it is further shown that the laws, as written or as applied, single
out that class for different treatment not based on some reasonable
classification." 80
CH.Ans KivBar.
Criminal Law-Premeditation and Deliberation-Jury Instructions-
Brutality of the Killing as Affecting
It is proper in North Carolina in a first degree murder trial
for the question of the defendant's premeditation and deliberation to
go to the jury with the instructions that the jury may use the conduct
of the accused before and after the crime, along with other attendant
circumstances, in deciding whether the elements of premeditation and
deliberation were present.1 Our court has held to be admissible as
evidence of the defendant's premeditation and deliberation: absence
of quarrels between the accused and the deceased,
2 previous threats,3
preparations made for the crime,4 absence of provocation,5 declarations
made by the accused, 6 and subsequent acts of the accused,7 other than
flight.
s
But there is some uncertainty in the holdings of the court as to
the exact circumstances in which the jury should consider the subse-
quent acts of the accused in determining premeditation and delibera-
tion. This uncertainty arises when cases approving an unqualified in-
"Hernandez v. Texas, 74 Sup. Ct. 667, 670 (1954).
State v. Lamn, 232 N. C. 402, 61 S. E. 2d 188 (1950) ; State v. Chavis, 231
N. C. 307, 56 S. E. 2d 678 (1949); State v. Harris, 223 N. C. 697, 38 S. E.
2d 29 (1943); State v. Evans, 198 N. C. 82, 150 S. E. 678 (1929).
'State v. Watson, 222 N. C. 672, 24 S. E. 2d 540 (1943); State v. Baity,
180 N. C. 722, 105 S. E. 149 (1920). It is interesting to note that while the
absence of quarrels between the accused and the deceased has been held to be
evidence from which the jury could infer premeditation and deliberation, the
presence of quarrels between the accused and the deceased has only been held
by our court to be evidence from which the jury may infer malice and ill-
feeling.
State v. Hawkins, 214 N. C. 326, 199 S. E. 284 (1938); State v. Bowner,
214 N. C. 249, 199 S. E. 31 (1938) ; State v. Payne, Z13 N. C. 719, 197 S. E.
573 (1938) ; State v. Grainger, 157 N. C. 628, 73 S. E. 149 (1911).
'State v. Baity, 180 N. C. 722, 105 S. E. 200 (1920) ; State v. Daniels, 164
N. C. 464, 79 S. E. 953 (1913).
' State v. Stewart, 226 N. C. 299, 38 S. E. 2d 29 (1946) ; State v. Cain, 178
N. C. 724, 100 S. E. 884 (1919).
' State v. Johnson, 172 N. C. 920, 90 S. E. 426 (1916).
"State v. Westmoreland, 181 N. C. 590, 107 S. E. 438 (1921).
' State v. Blanks, 230 N. C. 501, 53 S. E. 2d 452 (1949); State v. Evans,
198 N. C. 82, 50 S. E. 2d 678 (1929) ; State v. Steele, 190 N. C. 506, 130 S. E.
308 (1925). The reason for not holding flight as evidence from which the jury
might infer premeditation and deliberation is that flight from a crime might
just as easily result from a fear of guilty circumstances as from a guilty con-
science.
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